The 10-page risk report within Heathrow airport’s latest annual report does not mention North Hyde substation, or even substations in general, but it does describe the company’s approach to managing risks.
Heathrow rightly has “no appetite” for safety risks that could lead to loss of life. “Robust controls and contingency measures” are also in place to contain potential security, environmental and legal breaches within “minimal levels of impact”. But then one comes to operational matters, the category in which last Friday’s events would fall.
“The business accepts that absolute operational, system and infrastructure resilience is impossible,” it starts, adding vaguely that it will work to mitigate impacts “within the risk/return balance set by the company”. In summary: “In the pursuit of its objectives, Heathrow airport is willing to accept, in some circumstances, risks that may result in some financial loss or reputational exposure.”
So one question is whether Heathrow regarded the risk of closing the entire airport for a day in response to the loss of power from a single substation as one of those things that would simply have to be taken on the chin. Did “the risk/return balance” judge that it wasn’t worth spending a large sum of money to lessen the impact of an event judged unlikely to occur?
That would not be inconsistent with how Thomas Woldbye, Heathrow’s chief executive, has described the airport’s response. The backup systems “worked the way they should”, he said and he was proud of his staff. The reason it took so long to reopen – despite the airport having sufficient uninterrupted power from two other substations, as National Grid’s boss was quick to point out – was that internal systems for everything from baggage belts to escalators had to be “reconfigured” and tested.
Yet we need to know more. Does the reconfiguration process really have to be that slow and complex? Could investment in slicker systems have make the switch to alternative power supplies quicker and meant that fewer than 1,350 flights had to be stopped? Airlines will be interested to hear how Heathrow’s willingness to accept “some financial loss” was assessed in this context. After all, as Woldbye also said in interviews, it is up to airlines, not airports, to cover hotel bills and other disruption costs to passengers.
The point is that the failure of a substation is not an unimaginable event. The blaze at North Hyde may have been unprecedented, but the same risk report says Heathrow modelled contingency plans for major events, including “loss of a critical supplier or service”. If the modelled response was followed, which seems to be gist of Woldbye’s account, the question is whether a full day’s closure was deemed to be acceptable.
If so, it also matters who signed off on that judgment. Let’s hope we hear from John Holland-Kaye, Heathrow’s chief executive for 10 years before Woldbye, since he is now chairof Sizewell C, the proposed new nuclear power station in Suffolk, an operation where 100% reliable power in and out of the plant around the clock is very definitely an issue of safety. Did the Civil Aviation Authority regard Heathrow’s mitigation plan as an example of best practice? Was the transport secretary aware that Heathrow could be closed for a day if a single substation was knocked out?
National Grid, out of the blocks in the blame game before the stock market opened on Monday, will naturally also have to cough up details on North Hyde’s own resilience and the strain on the local transmission system in London. But going on what we’ve heard so far Heathrow’s risk management systems may be the most interesting of the various inquiries.
Ruth Kelly, a former transport secretary and a non-executive director of Heathrow, will lead an internal review. Only an internal review? Really? If one of the issues here turns out to be whether the company’s “risk/reward balance” was actually unbalanced, surely an external opinion is essential.
